Debris, lack of training, staffing issues contributed to deaths in Memorial Day flood

HOUSTON –

The final draft of the City of Houston report about what when wrong during the deadly Memorial Day flood said firefighters in a rescue boat hit debris in Brays Bayou causing it to capsize, killing three people.

The report also said firefighters performing water rescues may not have received an urgent message not to cross the dangerous currents on Brays Bayou.

Channel 2 Investigates obtained a copy Monday morning marked with "final draft" from the family of an elderly couple who were among those killed when the boat capsized. The city had been refusing to provide Channel 2 with the final report claiming it was not complete, but hours after Channel 2 reported on the "final draft" the city released the full report.

The report, titled "Emergency Response Internal Review" is dated Oct. 2, and was released to the public Monday afternoon, hours after Channel 2 Investigates broke the story to review the findings, and more than six months after the historic weather event.

[READ THE REPORT]

Channel 2 Investigates obtained a copy marked "final draft," from the family of an elderly couple who were among those killed when the boat capsized.

Firefighters determined the current and debris flowing in Brays Bayou made it "extremely hazardous to cross."

CAPSIZED RESCUE BOAT

At around 6:09 a.m. on May 26, a senior captain and other firefighters determined the current and debris flowing in Brays Bayou made it "extremely hazardous to cross."  The report states several attempts were made to notify all rescue boats on scene in the Meyerland area and warn them not to cross the bayou. It's not clear in the report if that warning was received by Rescue Boat 42, which around the same time, received an assignment to rescue citizens from rising water.

That assignment required the rescuers to cross Brays Bayou. As they made their way to the call, firefighters encountered three people standing outside at a home on North Braeswood. One rescuer got in the water, swam to the three people and brought them into the boat. Firefighters rescued a fourth civilian along the way and began to cross the bayou back to a staging location.

The report states as they crossed the bayou, the boat struck debris in the water causing the motor to come out of the water and lock up. Without power, the boat was pushed by the current into the South Post Oak Bridge where it took on water and capsized. The four civilians and two firefighters were thrown into the water. Three of those civilians died.

Reporter Jace Larson interviewed the son of the elderly couple killed in the incident.

"We as a family want answers to the questions. We feel like we deserve answers. The citizens of Houston also deserve answers. The citizens of Houston want to be justifiably proud of their fire department," Rory Alter said. "They need to know that when they get on a rescue boat they are not being taking on their final ride; that they are being rescued. This report offers the family and the citizens of Houston cold comfort."

TWO-SIDED PROBLEM IN MEYERLAND

The report cites a major problem with how crews were assigned to rescues in Meyerland. Once they arrived in the flood zone, HFD boats were assigned to operate on both the north and south side of Brays Bayou. But only one evacuee drop off location was established. That meant crews had to cross the bayou, in dangerous swift water conditions.

The committee recommendations state that in future swift water rescue events, "multiple evacuee collection points be established" to avoid crews crossing a body of water with a swift current.

The committee recommendations in the final draft state that in future swift water rescue events, "multiple evacuee collection points be established" to avoid crews crossing a body of water with a swift current.

BOATS NOT PROPERLY STAFFED, CREW OVERWORKED

As crews arrived in the Meyerland area the night and morning of the flooding, they discovered "an overwhelming number of citizens needing rescue."  The decision was made by command staff on the scene to separate officers from their crews to "place additional assets in-service."

The report states this decision "meant crew accountability was compromised when (2) two rescuers were operating in Rescue Boat 42 rather than (3) three members as outlined in the departmental operational guidelines.

By early morning, firefighters working water rescues had been on scene for more than eight hours. Relief crews were unable to make it to the flood zone. The reports states "crew fatigue and exhaustion set in due to continued number of rescues performed and extended work hours of operation."

OVERWHELMING EMERGENCY

By 2 a.m. on May 26, the impact of the heavy rain on Houston's central core began to overwhelm the city's emergency center. The Houston Emergency Communications Center (HEC) in North Houston was struck by lightning and lost power. Systems relied on backup power. All 17 dispatchers on duty at the time remained through the night, as additional staff was unable to make it to the building because of flooding on Shepherd Drive.

Calls to 911 began to overwhelm the center. At one point, HFD had more than 2,000 calls waiting to be processed and dispatched. The report states every communications officer on duty was either monitoring a radio console or calling citizens on the phone to get additional information on their conditions.

Communications problems were affecting rescue crews in the field, as well. The report stated a communications tower used to transmit emergency radio traffic was hit by lightning between 11 p.m. Monday and 2 a.m. Tuesday. That caused radio problems on the scene of many rescues in southwest Houston.
But the radio issues were not all weather-related. The report also cites human error in how radio channels were assigned to different members of technical rescue teams. The report stated this created multiple problems including a situation where "personnel were not able to hear essential strategic and tactical communications from rescue team members."

NOT ENOUGH SWIFT WATER TRAINING

The report focuses on an issue Channel 2 Investigates first brought to light in July, less than two months after the flood event. Firefighters operating rescue boats did not have enough swift water rescue training to prepare for rescues they encountered, the report says.

This report stated "members operating in rescue boats had limited swift water rescue experience and/or actual training in true swift water conditions."

The finding about training directly contradicts what Houston Mayor Annise Parker told Channel 2 Investigates in July when she stated firefighters received extensive training to perform swift water rescues.

But the city's internal report stated, "The team is non-deployable due to the inability to maintain current minimum training standards in competencies because compensation is not budgeted for training these members."

But the final draft of the city's internal report stated, "The team is non-deployable due to the inability to maintain current minimum training standards in competencies because compensation is not budgeted for training these members."

Some firefighters had previously volunteered for training, but the report states that because of the lack of city funding, some "lost interest and stopped volunteering for the training." Only three team members showed up for a voluntary class in Galveston.

Former Houston Fire Chief Terry Garrison pledged to provide swift water boat training to rescuers, but such training has still not occurred.

Garrison left the department in October.

MORE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the most significant recommendations in the report calls for the creation of four new district chief positions in the department, so a rescue district chief would be assigned to each shift, every day. This district chief would respond to all technical rescue incidents, including water rescues.

The report recommends a fire department budget for classroom and field training for swift water events. Different personnel would receive different levels of training, based on their assignments during a flood. The report also recommends a departmental certification program to outline all positions within the department that require special training and a system to recognize which firefighters have completed the necessary training so they can be assigned accordingly.

The district chiefs responding to high water rescues on May 26, did not have enough "real time" weather information detailing flood conditions along bayous. The report recommends developing "a process that provides HFD incident commanders with "real time" weather information from the Office of Emergency Management."

The report recommended additional water rescue assets be placed in service and staffed by personnel that can be called in to duty.  And it suggests decisions on additional staffing should be made prior to severe weather. The report states that current staffing guidelines need to be enforced.

PERSONAL FLOTATION DEVICES

Channel 2 Investigates first reported in July, the fire department lacked life jackets at the height of the Memorial Day flood.

Internal fire department records show a senior Houston Fire Department captain wrote there were "not enough citizen PFD's (personal flotation devices) for the amount of rescues being made by several different boats."

The final draft report includes a recommendation to inventory, inspect and replace personal flotation devices, as needed. It also recommends upgrading the type of flotation device used to a "Type-V" device rated for swift water rescues. The department added those new PFD's to rescue boats in August, following the initial Channel 2 Investigation.

RESPONSE FROM THE CITY

Channel 2 contacted Mayor Parker's office Monday morning to the reort's findings and initially a spokesperson wouldn't comment, citing possible litigation.

At an unrelated event later in the day, Parker praised firefighters.

"I think the firefighters did the best they could under the circumstances," Parker said. "The fire department chooses where they need to prioritize training."

Parker said she believes citizens are safer in flood situations than they were when she took office. She cited the city and county's effort to better hold water in drainage basins and new flood gates being installed at intersections in the city that commonly flood.

"We lose a whole lot more people who drive under flooded underpasses than we do people who get swept away in small rivers that go through Houston," Parker said.